Smarter Utility

 

[March 23, 2006]

Cutting-edge design is steep learning curve

(Lloyds List Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)FOR unexpected reasons the 2005-2006 Volvo Ocean Race is proving thrilling stuff, with boat damage and life-threatening experiences making headlines in specialist and mainstream press alike.

The boats themselves are in no small way responsible. The Volvo Open 70s are at the cutting edge of ocean racing design. Their low weight and large sail area mean they are capable of much higher speeds than their predecessors.

These are exciting boats. In reefed conditions they are incredibly fast and difficult to handle and in consequence are taking a battering far in excess of what many crews may have experienced.

In addition to the regular thrills and spills, the big news of the race so far is the spate of problems with canting keel mechanisms, along with one dismasting, some delamination and deck buckling.

These keels are a source of real fascination because they are fundamental to stability.

In simple terms, canting keels cant to port or starboard up to 40 from the vertical by means of hydraulically operated rams.

The effect is to reduce the amount of heel from any given sail plan, which means boats can carry more sail and so go faster.

The mechanism is encased in a 'bomb door'-type structure or similar boxing that keeps out sea water as they are moved from side to side when tacking.

Stress in this area is enormous, which has led to mechanism failure in some of the boats. None has sheared off but it is easy to visualise the shock effect from failure to respond to a change of tack.

The boat will be dangerously unbalanced and the mast and sail loadings put through conditions for which they were not designed.

But why the failures? On the assumption that the design, build and equipment meet the rules and operating criteria, how far is the onboard handling of the dynamic forces imposed by heavy weather conditions?

Or is it simply that the boats are being sailed too hard, with damage a natural consequence?

The problems have sparked a debate as to the boats' safety and whether the Volvo Open 70s are a design too far and simply too hot for their crews to handle.

The Volvo Ocean Race design and construction rules are well established and the Open 70 was developed by the race technical committee with input from designers.

Ultimately three design firms, Juan Kouyoumdjian, Farr Yacht Design and Don Jones, won commissions from the racing syndicates, though many designers did a lot of work in case they were chosen. There are design differences between the three that reflect the designer's individual approach to the concept.


JK designed ABN Amro One and Two, Farr was responsible for Pirates, Ericsson, movistar and Brasil 1 and Don Jones for ING Brunel. Builders and equipment manufacturers were also selected by the sponsoring syndicates.

The JK boats were built by Killian Bushe with Cariboni keel systems, two of the Farrs ( Pirates and Ericsson) by Green Marine, movistar by Boatspeed in Australia and Brasil 1 by Boatworks in Brazil. All were fitted with Marine ' Hydraulics keels.

Some of the boats were ready for sea trials a year before the race started. Others only had months.

But, due to the competitive nature of the racing syndicates, there was no formal exchange of trial and failure findings between syndicates. That changed by the time the fleet reached Melbourne.

Incidents along the way were numerous enough for the sharing of information and beefing up of mechanisms to ensure the race could continue as a competitive event while reducing the risk of serious consequences.

As to determining the cause of the keel failures, the picture is complicated by the number of independent parties in the design and build process.

While the JK design has not had the keel problems experienced by the Farr designs, Kouymoumdjian claims no special divinity. In an interview in the April issue of Seahorse he says it could happen to his design for a number of reasons.

Similarly, Russell Bowler of Farr Yacht Design pointed out in the March edition of Seahorse that each syndicate chose its own builders, equipment manufacturers, installers and finishers.

Significantly, however, the crews on the JK-designed boats ABN Amro One and Two had almost a year of testing, breaking and fixing, so when the race started they were more secure in their knowledge and experience of their boats than the others.

They are now comfortably leading the race and, even though the Farr designs are not incurring damage, they are not (yet) beating the JKs on the race track.

The Don Jones-designed ING Brunelhas not competed in every leg so a direct comparison is more difficult.

But, while design, build and equipment quality are clearly crucial when at sea, in tough conditions it is down to crew's experience of handling these complex creatures.

Fans need only to visit the multimedia-enabled VOR website to glimpse enough onboard sound and video, stills and diaries to demonstrate clearly the shocking conditions in which the sailors work when the wind and sea are really dishing it out. And, while the boats have gone up a technological notch or two, crew numbers have been cut from 12 to 10.

When paid to win, a balls-out attitude from the race crew is a prerequisite and it is not difficult to see how this could lead to hair-raising experiences.

Accelerating off a wave top at anything up to 30 knots, being airborne for three to five seconds, smashing on to a wave crest or slamming it side on with the keel at 40 degrees is a truly mind-boggling experience.

Repeating this process hundreds of times a day in those conditions will test any equipment to the limit and beyond.

At sea there would usually be three to four crew on deck in the normal watch pattern.

At high speed in the Atlantic or Southern Ocean, keeping the boat balanced and spreading the dynamic impact of pounding and slamming through the longitudinals and cross members may be a rough science, playing off head count against seamanship.

In such circumstances it is not difficult to see how things could go wrong. Changing gear to reduce the likelihood of structural damage, even keel loss and capsize, is not rapid in such heavy conditions.

The boat is constantly hosed by torrents of cold sea water so moving about the deck is slow and dangerous. Where wind speed rises rapidly the reaction time is limited even when the navigator calls the incoming blast.

To what degree are the problems due to crew struggling to manage these forces? These sailors are the best, even though it must be the toughest way to earn a living in nautical business.

As always, there are insurance issues in regard to the yacht's hull, rig, equipment and crew too.

While there will have been high value damage claims in the race for dismasting and equipment warranty, fortunately there has been no loss of life.

Insurance for the Volvo Ocean Race is placed through different channels than previously and, though cover details are confidential, each syndicate makes its own arrangements. The race organisers will also have cover for their areas of liability.

The fact remains that the race is a steep learning curve in managing the edge for designers, sailors and organisers alike, one which they are fast climbing as the latest relatively damage-free movistarexcepted Melbourne to Rio leg has demonstrated.

There will probably be modifications to future generations of Volvo Open 70s but the 2005-2006 race is ably demonstrating that its strapline 'Life at the Extreme' could not be more apt.

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